Modern Warfare – The Future ?

Introduction

An extra-terrestrial observer looking at the behaviour of Homo Sapiens de novo might reasonably assess our species as: ‘..having a marked addiction to conflict….’

This is certainly not a new phenomenon – evolution has done a remarkable job of embedding the need to compete into our psyche – and our genes. Without it, we would not have become the most successful and numerous species on the planet. It is that very success, however, and the remarkable advances in technology that has enabled it, that now threatens our very existence....

War has been our principal way of solving territorial disputes between tribes and nations for millennia. Until relatively recently, although often brutal in its execution, warfare caused little real harm from a global perspective. The First World War (WWI) was the first real ‘mass killing’ event for our species, and even this debacle, with all its horrors, was confined largely to Europe. Its consequences, including the millions killed in the trenches and in the subsequent influenza epidemic, were admittedly much greater than anything seen previously in terms of numbers, but even in the 'battlefield' states any structural destruction was limited. Since the fighting was confined largely to a small area within Europe, it still failed to make much impact on the world population as a whole, or on the environment itself.

It was only the development and use of the first atomic weapons at the end of the Second World War (WWII) that brought us the possibility of self-destruction on a grand scale. The subsequent headlong arms race between the two superpowers from the 1960s to the late 1980s cemented this capability in place and vastly increased the arsenals of nuclear weapons available to us, and their level of sophistication as weapons of mass destruction.

It also gave rise to the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD). This realisation arose because the two principal opponents, the Western Alliance and the Soviet Union, were well-matched in nuclear armaments. It was therefore obvious that a full-scale nuclear exchange initiated by one of them would provoke an immediate full-scale strategic response and devastate both their and the other’s territory. This would probably render the rest of the planet uninhabitable for our species, and many others, for thousands of years into the future. 

Although we managed to survive this first part of the nuclear age without major incident, the cold war period did generate several tense nuclear 'stand-offs', the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963 arguably being the closest we came to a full-scale nuclear conflict.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, however, we have effectively been living on ‘borrowed time’.

The chaos following the breakup of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was indeed a dangerous period, given the plethora of nuclear weapons still held across the old soviet republics, and the political turmoil and uncertainties that prevailed. The re-emergence of the Russian Federation in the early 2000s under Putin did appear to restore some semblance of stability, but the meteoric economic rise of China and rapid development of its military capabilities in turn created a 3-way power ‘split’. This was complicated further by the emergence of a series of  ‘rogue’ state regimes, each prepared to play one superpower off against the others to achieve their own objectives.  

Fortunately, so far only one of these, N. Korea, is currently nuclear-armed.  Nuclear weapons have proliferated beyond the superpowers to a number of other states, however, not all of which could be regarded as having stable political systems. Some other regimes  are actively seeking to build up nuclear arsenals, the most worrying of those being Iran. The Western alliance has declared its determination to stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, but Iran’s recent close association with Russia and their active participation in the supply of arms to Putin’s Ukrainian war has complicated the issue, and Iran could yet acquire a limited nuclear capability from Russia 'under the counter' as a reward for services rendered. If it does, this would provide an additional potential flash point in the middle east, particularly given the sworn objective of its ruling theocracy to destroy Israel (itself the only nuclear-armed middle-eastern state, and now with a far-right government coalition determined to promote its own interests above all others). 

Putin also has other 'rogue state' partnerships in mind, and is already 'courting' Kim Jong Un in an attempt to form an alliance. The N. Korean leader visited Moscow last autumn for talks on arms supplies to Russia, which are now flowing in, along with a steady supply of hardware from Iran, to support the Ukraine war. The main concern is the price Kim will eventually extract from a desperate Kremlin. A revival of the N. Korean economy through food and oil donations and, in particular, access to key military technology so far unavailable due to sanctions, is on the cards, and this could result in an even more aggressive stance on the part of the N. Koreans on the continued US-S.Korean military buildup. Kim seems recently to have recognised the value of drone warfare, and is busy emulating Russian drone technology gifted to him by Putin recently - Seoul beware.

Proxy Wars vs Global Conflict

The steady dwindling of available resources and the continued rapid and largely unchecked growth of the world’s population over the past 20 years have increased the risk of resource-driven conflict, as can be seen from the numerous ‘proxy wars’ that have been fought over the last two decades. The current Middle East flare-up is but one example of a pressure-release process that holds back large scale global conflict, while allowing rival powers to maintain their positions and justify their existence with their home populations. The intense rivalry between Israel and the islamic world, notably Iran, has simmered for decades and shows no sign of any sort of resolution yet. The latest exacerbation in the form of the October 7th attack by HAMAS and the resulting Gaza conflict may yet turn into a pan-middle east conflict - something which Iran has always had in mind in order to establish its dominance over the region. The ongoing Covid pandemic, although a temporary unifying force to some extent, hastened this process further by holding back economic progress, and will continue to do so for some time yet, particularly in China.

Despite this 'safety valve' effect of proxy conflicts, we are now in a situation where world events are becoming increasingly unpredictable. Many feel that we may be on the brink of self-destruction, given the enhanced belligerence of both China and Russia under their increasingly autocratic regimes, and the economic instability we are currently experiencing worldwide. To say nothing of an increasingly likely second Trump presidency with Vance as VP....as concerned onlookers, we can only hope that the US electorate come to their senses before November...

On the face of it, a Third World War is certainly still a possibility – probably more so than at any time since the end of WWII.

How likely is it that a full-scale nuclear conflict will break out in the next 5 years ?

The Third World War – When and How ?

The answer to this question can of course only be speculative, especially at this precarious stage of our species' development. However, I believe that the prospect of a full-scale nuclear conflict is perhaps less likely than it might appear at first sight. Why ?

Although ‘rogue’ states such as N. Korea have already acquired nuclear capability, and others such as Iran may eventually do so, despite the best efforts of the world community, they do not have the power or resources to start, or indeed wage, a full scale conventional or nuclear war individually without the intervention, and support, of one or more of the superpowers. 

Despite their often belligerent posturing, they realise they would quickly be stopped if they tried using any form of nuclear weapon without permission from at least one superpower ally, with devastating consequences for their populations and, more to the point, the inevitable extinction of their own ruling regimes. Moreover, their nuclear arsenals are, and are likely to remain, relatively small, and also fission weapon-based, and would therefore be unlikely to trigger a full scale nuclear conflict per se.

Of the nuclear-armed states, only N. Korea presents a real risk of  initiating a nuclear strike (probably initially on its neighbour, S. Korea) at present. The obsessive paranoia that characterises the thinking of the leadership could lead to a small-scale first nuclear strike. However, despite their frequent missile tests, which are essentially 'sabre-rattling' exercises, the N. Koreans  are unlikely to be in a position to wage any kind of  full-scale war actively anytime soon, given the appalling state of their economy and the deteriorating health of their civilian population, much of which is nearing starvation (this distress is of course as a direct result of their leader's obsession with squandering his nation's resources on increasingly ambitious and expensive armaments in an attempt to keep his 'dynasty' in power). The regime's recent claim to have a working nuclear submarine capable of delivering nuclear warheads has yet to be verified  (if it is ever proven, it may well precipitate punitive action from the Western allies, given the obvious danger to shipping in the vicinity). A 'local' nuclear strike on the Korean peninsula would in any case be likely provide nuclear fallout on large areas of N. Korea itself, which will not have escaped the regime's notice. 

It is thus probably only one or more of the superpowers who could effectively 'hit the red button' and launch a nuclear WWIII in the 'traditional' way.

Nearer home, Iran is arguably more of an ongoing threat to world peace, given the regime's stated objective to erase Israel, itself an established nuclear power, from the face of the earth. Iran is already nearing the point at which it may acquire a limited nuclear capability, probably supported in its efforts by Russia. If it does so, we should expect things to go downhill rapidly - a pre-emptive strike on the Iranian nuclear development sites by Israel is by no means out of the question if this happens, particularly now Iran has been unequivocally identified as the primary backer of Hamas, Hizbollah and the Houthis, and therefore proven complicit in recent terrorist and latterly missile attacks against Israel. It is therefore a direct and ongoing threat to the Israeli regime, and has global 'form' via its responsibility by proxy. 

Is a Global Conflict likely to happen, and what form would it take ?

To answer this, we must first try to look into the minds of the respective leaders of the two principal superpower alliances and assess at what advantage they might think could be achieved by doing so.

Clearly the prime motivation amongst Western leaders will be to maintain the status quo as far as possible, while keeping in check any and all territorial threats from the Eastern powers, particularly in the European area. MAD is universally accepted by NATO and the West as the ultimate deterrent, and a nuclear first strike by NATO would only ever be a last resort in response to an imminent nuclear attack on one or more of its members. NATO has however pledged to defend any of its members who are attacked by a foreign power, so would be obliged to respond militarily to any conventional incursion anywhere within its members' territories. Despite Putin’s hope that the Ukraine conflict would divide Europe, the reverse has happened, with NATO arguably much stronger now than at any time since its formation, and more willing to resist any 'demands' from the Eastern bloc. Despite Putin's posturing, I see little evidence that NATO has any designs on appropriating any existing Eastern bloc territory, but it will steadfastly defend NATO members and reserves the right to consider any applications from new ones to join. A notable example is Ukraine, although membership won't, of course, be considered until the current war ends and some form of settlement with Russia is reached. 

There are some concerns about the effect of a second Trump presidency on NATO, but this, and the precise outcome of the USA's likely return to isolationism in that event are by no means certain. If nothing else, it has already alerted Europe to the possibility that they could be left 'out in the cold' militarily by a resurgent Trump administration, and has encouraged more resilient defence spending of the 27 in the face of this.

The Russian and Chinese leaderships now are well aware of this situation, but are still uncertain as to how far NATO will go to defend its territory and influence, so will continue to probe for information, and will also periodically ‘test the water’ militarily. Symptoms of this continuing covert intelligence war have been clearly visible recently in the US Chinese 'weather' balloon incident and periodic incursions of Russian vessels into NATO territorial waters.  This evident need for data and intelligence brings us to a third important question.

How might a future World War Develop ?

Given the likelihood that the superpowers have all accepted the reality of MAD, none would be likely to initiate a nuclear conflict unless they felt their existence was actively threatened. 

Even Putin, with his current obsessional 'bunker' mentality, was grudgingly forced to admit last autumn that he would only resort to nuclear weapons if he felt his (i.e. Russia’s) existence was directly threatened. Although Putin's pronouncements are not exactly noted for their veracity, this particular assertion is probably true - for now. There are, however worrying indications that he may be fast losing his grip on reality, living as he does in an information-deprived 'bubble' surrounded by those who dare not give him a true picture of events, and unable to venture much beyond his own territorial boundaries due to his international arrest warrant for war crimes. The unsettling effect of Prighozin's abortive coup and its aftermath will likely have added to the paranoia. The recent embarrassment generated by Ukraine's incursion into western Russia with apparently little resistance, certainly won't help. We can only hope that the instincts of self-preservation within his military top-brass are sufficient to prevent him pressing the red button.

Despite all this political instability, and the uncertainty it brings, the principal underlying danger is still that of a trigger event caused by human (or indeed machine!) error. If a simple mis-coded cyber security update can virtually shut down many of the West's principal computer operating systems, how safe from a nuclear holocaust are we really ?

There are ample precedents to support the assertion that we aren't.... 

A rather disturbing report emerged after the USSR's demise in the early 1990s of Soviet early warning systems taking their war machine to the equivalent of the US’s ‘DefCon1’ before identifying the ‘threat’ as a machine error, probably caused by a malfunctioning satellite. There have even been credible reports in the past of lower level alerts being triggered by large flocks of high-flying geese. There is potentially an even greater threat of this type of malfunction in early warning systems nowadays, given the opportunities for malicious hackers to overcome internet firewalls and penetrate networked command and control systems – on both sides of the East-West ‘divide’.

The Rise and Rise of Electronic Warfare (EW)

There is another important consideration here which is likely to influence the direction in which modern warfare develops. Conventional warfare rarely achieves much territorial gain when the opposing forces are equally matched. There are numerous examples of this, from the static nature of the WWI trenches to Putin’s singular lack of progress against the Ukrainians in the 'fighting seasons' of 2022 and 2023, despite Russia’s overwhelming technical military superiority and resources. It is therefore no surprise that military leaders and their civilian counterparts are turning to electronic means of waging war.

Even as far back as WWII the earliest developments in code-breaking and data acquisition in the early 1940s at Bletchley Park showed how essential intelligence could be in deciding the outcome of conventional modern warfare. The invention, and now virtually universal availability, of the internet, and more recently the much acclaimed advent of the ‘internet of things’ has itself provided the ultimate tool for attacking an enemy’s way of life remotely, from its networked command & control systems to its civilian infrastructure.

It is no coincidence that one of Putin’s earliest military 'sorties', made before actually invading Ukraine in February 2022, was an attempt to take down as much of Ukraine’s infrastructure as possible by electronic sabotage. Fortunately this early intervention, although initially quite promising, proved less successful than he anticipated, and the Ukrainian leadership were able to adapt to the new EW attacks relatively quickly. They also gained valuable insight into their own vulnerabilities, Putin's strategy to exploit them, and how to thwart his efforts. 

The important point to appreciate here is the direction of travel – both Russia and China have literally ‘armies’ of state-employed hackers dedicated to seeking out weak points in Western control networks. Russia’s determined ongoing efforts to destroy as much of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure as possible from the air, despite the universal acceptance that this amounts to a war crime, shows how much importance they attach to this ‘off-battlefield’ approach to weakening enemy resolve. 

China, meanwhile, has adopted another approach by entering the 'space race', ostensibly for peaceful means. However, their use of an anti-satellite device in low-earth orbit to destroy one of their own defunct weather satellites recently showed us that this technology was in fact designed to enhance their ability to knock out orbital electronic infrastructure during a future conflict. Their uncharacteristic openness in publicising this test suggest it was intended more as a demonstration to potential adversaries than a bona-fide space junk clearing exercise. Indeed, such events can in no way be described as orbital  'clean-up' processes, but rather acts of space vandalism. Destroying a large object in low-earth orbit merely increases the hazard many-fold by creating many thousands of additional pieces of debris travelling at ca 18,000 mph, any of which could destroy another satellite in an intersecting orbit....or indeed a whole space station. 

The Ukraine conflict has led to a marked uptick in the development and application of EW. Development of the Palantir software and the vastly-increased monitoring capacity through battlefield and remote satellite sensors have enabled true 'algorithmic warfare' to be rolled out under operational conditions for the first time. The unexpected success of the Ukrainian fightback against an ill-prepared and trained Russian conscript army has been greatly assisted by this new technology, which enables battlefield commanders to effectively 'penetrate the fog of war'. By providing continuous updates on the precise battlefield locations of the enemy and predictions of his short term movements, the technology allows a directed 'kill chain' to be established. 

Use of critical 'real time' intelligence in this way is not unprecedented in modern warfare - my own father's WWII contribution at Bletchley Park in breaking the Italian Navy's Hagelin P38 cipher, and providing vital decodes of Italian naval high command's messages thereafter, enabled the Royal Navy and Air Force to predict the movements of the Italian battle fleet accurately and inflict heavy damage. What was left of the Italian fleet then promptly withdrew to their naval bases and remained there until the Italians surrendered to the Allies in 1943. This intelligence breakthrough drastically reducing Rommel's ability to resupply his North African troops by sea. As a result the 3rd Reich was forced to commit more forces and much-needed ordnance resources to the North African campaign that might otherwise have reinforced their European and Russian fronts, possibly changing the course and duration of the war as a result. The cracking of Hagelin is considered to have been highly significant, so much that prime minister Winston Churchill visited Hut 4 on a visit to Bletchley Park to thank the team for their endeavours.

The 'intelligence war' waged so effectively by Bletchley Park and its associated civilian and military intelligence service personnel throughout the war relied heavily on absolute secrecy, and the 'Enigma story' was not revealed until selected records were declassified in the mid-1970s. Hagelin's cipher technology also figured large in Crypto AG's post-war efforts in supplying encoding support to many 'rogue' regimes, and the 'back door' developed from Bletchley's decryption success enabled the UK and US intelligence services to keep tabs on their activities during the cold war era and beyond. Some of the operational details surrounding Hagelin remain classified to this day, demonstrating how seriously governments regard encryption as a key weapon of war.

How Great is the Risk to our Western Way of Life posed by Electronic Warfare ?

Although battlefield EW of the sort being 'field tested' in the Ukraine conflict can be effective on a local level, there is another more far-reaching aspect to EW which is potentially much more dangerous - and effective. We are now virtually completely dependent on the internet for almost every aspect of our lives. This dependence is not limited to the first world – a large and ever-increasing proportion of the third world population now have, and rely on, mobile phones. The infrastructure of their countries, such as it is, is becoming equally dependent on internet-connected technology. This renders us all uniquely vulnerable to electronic attack. 

Not only is state-sponsored hacking an established ‘industry’ now, but an ever increasing army of misguided private individuals are trying their hands at penetrating all manner of supposedly firewall-protected systems. The fact that a UK-based autistic teenager could and did penetrate the Pentagon’s inner 'secure' networks recently, and is still fighting extradition to the US to face trial, demonstrates just how vulnerable we are to this type of intervention. The use of NSO's Pegasus software by a large number of states to spy on their populations and those of other nations via their mobile phones is another and even more insidious development in the intelligence war. Although Pegasus has been used largely to track and suppress dissidents, any of the data it accumulates could be significant in wider conflicts.

Is there a solution to this unexpectedly adverse by-product of universal connectivity ?

Yes, but it’s certainly not an easy one to implement.... 

The only hope we have of surviving internet-induced systems 'meltdown’ after a state-sponsored external attack (or indeed an unintentional self-induced one!) is to develop systems which can be isolated from the open internet completely whenever required, by removing any form of physical or radio connection to it. 

This is of course virtually impossible with the existing infrastructure, if we are to maintain our current way of life. Almost everything we do now involves interaction with the worldwide web in some respect, often via wireless (and therefore easily interceptable) connections. GPS technology also figures large in enabling our daily lives, and is dependent on vulnerable satellite and internet links. 

And there is no ‘backup system’ to revert to if it all goes wrong - apart from anything else, the complexity and extent of our reliance on instantaneous data transfer, and the size of our population would overwhelm old-style paper-based and stand-alone computer systems. 

We can all demonstrate this vulnerability for ourselves by considering what the effect on our own individual lives would be if the internet suddenly went down completely (including all the mobile phone networks, satellite links and GPS systems). How quickly would things go awry, and how on earth would we all cope if it all stayed out of action for a long period, or even permanently ?

“…But isn’t this just pure alarmism…it'll probably never happen”,  I hear you say….

There may be a grain of truth there, in that it might never happen. 

However, for safety's sake we should anticipate a full scale EW attack of some sort in future, and ensure our systems are as robust as possible against it. 

As a preliminary, we can assess what the consequences of such an attack might be by looking at a natural event which occurred in the relatively recent past, and is likely to have  a similar effect when it recurs - which it will eventually. 

Our local neighbourhood star, the sun, is a remarkably stable and well-behaved 'beast' as far as stars go; without its remarkable consistency of output we would simply never have existed. Like all of us, however, it does have occasional bouts of indigestion, which can, and do, give rise to what are called 'coronal mass ejections'. 

These are perfectly normal periodic solar events, and result in an abnormally high volume of solar material being thrown out in to space, some of which heads in our direction and hits our atmosphere some 24 hours later. When the remnants of one of these ejections hits the ionosphere, it produces large amounts of ionised material, which has the potential to induce very high voltages in metallic conductors. This can in turn damage the sensitive electronics within our satellites and even burn out our terrestrial power grids. Although the ‘solar wind’ is ever-present and is normally deflected effectively by our magnetic field, just giving us no more than an occasional spectacular display of the Aurora Borealis in the Northern Hemisphere, a severe solar storm would overcome the protective effects of our magnetic field and generate damaging 'ion-showers' with widespread effects on our infrastructure and communications. 

The problem is that the timing of these major solar eruptions is not easily predictable. Although they are relatively rare (fortunately for us, given our current reliance on all things electronic !), historical records show that this type of event appears to happen roughly once a century - and we haven’t had a major occurrence since the mid-1800s. I'll leave the statisticians among you to work out the probability of such an event occurring within the next decade...

What can we do to reduce our vulnerability ?

All this highlights the need for a more robust electronic infrastructure, and a more enlightened attitude to internet connectivity and its vulnerabilities. There’s not much we can do about the sun’s behaviour, given the static nature of our power grids and satellite systems, but we can reduce our exposure to more earthbound threats. 

Notwithstanding the additional costs and the readjustment to our way of life, we would be much better off doing this with our systems intact. This would be far more effective, and a whole lot cheaper, than  rather than trying to 'pick up the pieces' after the inevitable ‘crisis’ hits, millions of lives have been lost, and we have to rebuild everything from scratch after a war which we might well have lost outright in the first few days of cyber-hostilities. Winning WWIII, when it comes, will be dependent on having more robust control systems which are effectively protected from the unwelcome attentions of our adversaries.

It was interesting to note recently that our own intelligence services in UK showed themselves to be more than a little concerned about our vulnerabilities in this respect. A spate of articles released as recently as 2022 highlighted the need for vigilance, particularly against pervasive Chinese influence, and there is now an unusual degree of openness (for a state security service, that is!) in the measures being taken to tackle the threats. This marked change in emphasis actually does make sense for the security services, since it not only exposes what a potential enemy is already up to, but also serves to advertise the need for all of us to take whatever precautions we can in our daily lives.

If there is a moral to this story, perhaps in the form of a New Year message for 2025, it would probably be:

“…The internet is a remarkable and life-changing invention, but we need to redouble our efforts to protect ourselves against online threats from those who might wish to do us harm…”

Is there a Perceived Need for a Third World War ?

In the minds of Western Alliance leaders, almost certainly not – the domestic problems already demanding their immediate attention are legion, and are unlikely to be fully soluble any time soon. A prolonged mobilisation of NATO armies would tax our collective militaries severely, and be economically ruinous to its member countries as a whole. A look at the vast ongoing annual costs of NATO's arms supply to Ukraine should convince anyone of that, and its effects in reducing conventional weapon stockpiles have already taken their toll on our combat-readiness. 

There is, however, an underlying need to prevent the spread of Russian and Chinese dominance, particularly in Europe, and prevent loss of control of the supplies of some scarce resources; the loss of access to key SE Asian manufacturing capacity and raw materials, for example, would be far more costly to the West.

What about the Eastern Alliance ?

Here things are less clear cut. Russia is probably the easiest of the two major players to predict in the short term at least, given that Putin has set his store by reconstituting as much of the original Soviet empire as possible (without, of course, the 'inconvenience' of the old Soviet communist Politburo element itself to challenge his dominance!). Putin also knows full well that the success of his regime also depends on taking control of the Ukraine’s mineral wealth, particularly its rare earth deposits, most of which lie in the disputed Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. This is a less well-publicised, but nevertheless important factor in the rationale for his Ukraine 'adventure'. 

Putin is therefore committed to continuing the Ukraine conflict to its end, or until his own regime is ousted by an exasperated Russian populace, or perhaps more likely by his own military - 'Ukraine or bust', in fact. The future for Russia itself ‘post-Putin’ appears grim at present, and we can probably predict that it would be in no position to wage a full scale World War, given its much weakened economic position and its self-induced legacy as a pariah state, even it does manage to avoid a descent into a fractious and uneasy alliance of 'tribal' factions when Putin finally departs.

The Chinese Question

China is an entirely different ‘kettle of fish’. Despite its own valiant efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to stem population growth under the ‘one child’ policy, its already vast and still increasing population, with their much increased expectation of prosperity, virtually demands that the leadership adopt an aggressively expansionist policy – both economically and territorially.

The Chinese leadership recognised this from the start, and clearly set their sights on first winning the economic war, recognising that an outright military ‘victory’ could never be on the cards in the modern inter-dependent economic world. To a large extent they have succeeded in their quest for regional economic domination, now that Putin’s Russia has virtually eclipsed itself as a major rival economy. India, although still a player, remains mired in uncontrollable population growth and rural poverty, and to add to its woes, has now also surpassed even China as the most populous nation on the planet. Given its demographic problems and the religious divide becoming accentuated by the  hard-line Modi government, it is therefore unlikely to surpass China's economic or military superiority any time soon. 

On the global front, despite its current slowdown, it is likely that China will soon overtake the US as the world’s largest economy. China also realises that its dominance in the supply of rare earths and other essential components of modern electronics needs to be maintained as a bargaining chip – its ‘courting’ of African republics such as DRC who have substantial mineral deposits is directed towards this aim. 

It also has its sights set on reclaiming Taiwan, which currently has a dominant role in producing much of the world's microprocessor chip supplies. Although Beijing justifies its claim on Taiwan on territorial and ideological grounds, we should not ignore the fact that the strategic importance of Taiwan's microprocessor industry will be a major driver in any decision on an invasion. A monopoly on semiconductor manufacture would be even more valuable to China than the economic boost Hong Kong provided for it in the 1990s. It is no coincidence that the US in particular is actively looking at ramping up its own chip production, and sourcing these vital elements of our electronic revolution from outside SE Asia. The importance of Taiwanese chip production  may in fact represent a 'silver lining' of sorts for the island,in that the Chinese will want to leave the manufacturing infrastructure intact in any military campaign, so won't be able to 'flatten the island into submission' as Putin is aiming to do in Ukraine. See below for more discussion on the likely fate of Taiwan.

China has also recognised that economic downturns in the West present it with an opportunity to snap-up assets in these countries and offer financial support to infrastructure projects. Many western governments have now belatedly woken up to the danger and are blocking acquisitions deemed to present significant strategic risk.

However, the predicted 'rise and rise' in Chinese economic dominance is by no means a done deal and there are serious problems ahead for China. Although the Chinese economy has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past 20 years, it has become a victim of its own success in raising expectations of continual expansion, both internally and worldwide. The Chinese experience with Covid in 2022 has severely challenged this assumption, and the uncontrolled abandonment of all Covid restrictions without establishing adequate population immunity, compounded the problems by inducing a large increase in sickness and mortality. Although getting real data on the Covid epidemic out of China is like trying to get ‘blood out of a stone’, and official PRC figures are obviously gross underestimates, best estimates based on our Western experience with SARS-CoV-2 suggests that deaths in the millions are likely to have occurred from the first post-lockdown wave alone. 

Given the extreme infectiousness of the current 'suite' of Omicron variants, multiple subsequent waves are to be expected before natural and acquired immunity achieves reaches steady state, and the population ‘learns to live with’ the virus as an endemic agent. Given that the overall world 'kill rate' of SARS-CoV-2 to date excluding China is ca 0.5%, and we should expect approx twice this in a population with little pre-existing immunity, a total of ca 15 million out of a population of ca 1.5 billion is probably realistic, with the bulk of deaths occurring in older age groups. China is indeed fortunate that SARS-CoV-2 had such a low kill rate - its predecessor, SARS-CoV which started in China in 2003, had an estimated fatality rate of 10-20%.

Paradoxically, the pandemic and its aftermath might actually prove to have helped the Chinese economy in the medium term by removing a significant proportion of the elderly who are economically inactive and heavily dependent on state support. Both the SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 (Covid19) epidemics actually originated in China, and statistically there is a good chance that the next pandemic will also start there, so the Chinese economy is unlikely to have a clear run of expansion from now on and may remain 'stop-start' for the foreseeable future. It's growth rate is already looking decidedly lack-lustre as compared with pre-Covid era and may never reach such remarkable heights again. Its economy is also  mired in debt, largely as a result of the housing market 'bubble' which has now spectacularly failed.

All this suggests that Xi Jinping will be reluctant to become actively involved in all-out military conflict with the West, at least until the current Covid crisis in China has been overcome, and the demographic 'time bomb' and debt problem dealt with.

That said, chairman Xi has personally committed himself to re-uniting Taiwan with the mainland. As discussed, this objective is not just based on personal pride or a desire for territorial integrity – Taiwan has the most advanced semiconductor industry in the world and much of our Western technology depends on free access to their marketplace. Taking back control of Taiwan would therefore represent a formidable economic weapon, in the short term at least, and may present a sufficient incentive for Xi to risk open conflict with the US over an invasion of the island. Despite the ongoing military posturing, however, it is more likely that a settlement will be sought with the West over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Given Hong Kong’s recent experience, however, the Taiwanese may be difficult to convince.

There are thus plenty of incentives for the Eastern Alliance to wage war, although the form this might take is uncertain, and is likely to be delayed until the medium term. China has been actively ‘currying favour’ economically with non-aligned nations in Africa and the Third World generally for the past 20 years, and will continue to extend its reach wherever possible in pursuit of its economic and diplomatic objectives. It will also expect a return on its ‘investments’ in the form of raw materials and support in any world conflict, military or otherwise.

We in the West should therefore not rule out a global conflict in the next 5 years, given that the stakes are increasing year by year. What's more in question is the nature of that conflict.

Conclusion: How might the Third World War be Fought ?

Contrary to popular belief, WWIII is unlikely to start (and therefore probably quickly end) with an all-out nuclear exchange. As we have seen, the risks of MAD are simply too great. 

In a sense, it is perhaps fortunate that we have already experienced the disruptive effects of limited nuclear release events, both from the WWII Japanese atomic aftermath and the more recent nuclear accidents at 3-Mile Island, Fukoshima and Chernobyl. These have shown beyond doubt how easily we could render life as we know it impossible on our planet, both locally and globally through long-range radioactive fallout.

Provided we can continue to avoid accidental triggering of a nuclear holocaust, it is much more likely that a ‘global’ conflict would start with a limited conventional war involving one of the superpowers, pulling in one or both of the opposing superpowers due to the effects of that conflict on the rest of the world. 

Sounding familiar, perhaps ?

We may in fact have already witnessed the early stages of  a 'proxy' WWIII in 2023, given the effects of the Ukraine war on world food supplies and general economic prosperity, and the increased polarisation between NATO and the ‘Eastern Alliance’ formed recently between Russia and China.

The start of hostilities may, in the history books of the future, be seen as the second ‘official’ invasion of Ukrainian territory by Russian troops in February 2022. It could even be taken as an event further back in time. This would probably be be the initial covert participation of Russian troops in the Donbas region of Ukraine in support of 'the rebels' in 2014, although the exact date is more difficult to verify precisely. The subsequent annexation of Crimea later that year would be another obvious starting point. However we delineate it in future, a formal declaration of war may not be necessary to take us into the next stage of WWIII, and a declaration might even be seen by the players in the conflict as restricting their options.

Assuming for a moment that we're not actually there yet, a full-scale global war would be more likely to develop in future from a regional one, such as Ukraine, or via a periodic flare-up of the ever-simmering Middle East standoff, and the majority of the subsequent ‘battle’ would probably not involve conventional physical troop movements with 'set piece' battlefield interactions.

As already discussed, a much more effective way of bringing a modern state to its knees is to destroy its infrastructure, particularly its computer systems – and thereby to deny it access to its command and control systems. Although much devastation can be achieved by directed missile strikes, these are by their nature localised. As we have seen recently in the Ukrainian conflict, their effect on the civilian population also forfeits the ‘moral high ground’ with the world community, and condemns the perpetrator state to prolonged pariah status, and a painful and costly rehabilitation thereafter. It also risks rallying support for the cause both within the affected territories and outside them.  The ‘battle for hearts and minds’ should not be discounted as an important part of any non-nuclear conflict, especially a global one.

As electronic warfare becomes more sophisticated and effective, it’s likely that much of the  ‘battlefield’ will transfer to the ether. This is because even a limited nuclear exchange would be devastating on a regional scale, and it would be almost impossible to avoid it going global. Despite the recent advances in  algorithmic prediction and monitoring, conventional battlefield warfare where the two sides are evenly matched quickly becomes bogged down – it is also horrendously expensive, given the cost of modern weaponry and its associated technology. The logistic difficulties associated with moving large numbers of troops even short distances also provide a powerful disincentive. 

To illustrate this, we have only to consider the financial effects of the Ukraine conflict so far. In the first 18 months of the war, the West  poured many billions into weapons for Ukraine, and continue to do so in response to Zalensky's incessant entreaties. While a the risk of a Trump 2nd presidency is producing a degree of 'resupply drag' at present, Europe has woken up to the imminent danger a Russian victory in Ukraine would represent to their territory, and even Trump would be forced to bow to NATO pressure if this were on the cards. Putin's economy is still at risk of meltdown and only Russia’s copious oil and gas reserves, and the revenues they generate from the few remaining buyers who are still willing to defy sanctions, have saved him from bankruptcy in the face of his extensive troop and weapon losses – and the attritional effects of sanctions on Russia's economy. 

Thus, arguably, the only viable option for any autocratic leader seeking world dominance is to seize electronic control and hold the enemy to ransom. This method has the added advantage that infrastructure is not destroyed on either side, and resources are not squandered in fruitless military strikes. And such a strategy will remain perfectly feasible as long as we continue to depend on universal open connectivity via the internet and the phone networks to enable our way of life. 

Another indicator of active EW development along these lines which has surfaced recently is a report that Putin is developing space-based nuclear capability. This is distinct from Reagan's 1980s 'star wars' technology in that it is aimed at taking out satellites rather than deploying multiple warheads aimed at terrestrial targets. As discussed, command and control systems, whether civilian or military all rely heavily on satellite comms, particularly GPS. Putin's thinking may be that a  selective pre-emptive strike on key western satellite technology could force major territorial concessions from NATO as an alternative to full scale  nuclear war, and allow him to achieve his stated goal of re-establishing the 'Soviet empire'.  The West should be concerned here - at the very least, nuclear explosions in near earth orbit would present a major hazard to operational hardware - for everyone - and it would be difficult to recover from this type of 'space vandalism' since the resulting highly radioactive orbital debris would remain in place  for thousands of years and be virtually impossible to clear away.

There are plenty of unresolved issues that could 'drive' a global conflict, not the least of which is depletion of resources and continued unfettered population growth. We should not therefore assume it will never happen.

We may perhaps take a crumb of comfort from the fact that both nuclear and conventional 'set piece' military conflicts are now widely acknowledged to be essentially unwinnable. The alliance which manages to win the electronic war, without devastating its own and its opponent’s territory, however, is likely to take the prize – perhaps without even firing a shot….we must ensure we in the West don't end up on the losing side through our own inaction. 

Final thoughts: Will we ever manage to abolish war ?

As stated in the opening paragraph, Homo Sapiens as a species has an addiction to war, and we should probably regard this as the default state. 

History readily bears this out - military conflict is virtually continuous somewhere in the world, and has been since records began. Proxy wars have become the 'staple' method of waging war since the dawn of the nuclear age, given the implications of a full scale global nuclear conflict  for our species' survival. 

How does Artificial Intelligence (AI) figure in all this ?

The advent and rapid development of AI is likely to widen the scope of warfare again by removing or even replacing the battlefield element with strategic military and economic objectives. Some (rather naively) believe that AI will solve many of our problems as a society and make us all less vulnerable to the vagaries of human error. If anything, however,  it will increase our vulnerability. AI is a remarkable tool in the right hands, but the complex algorithms needed to power it are understood by only a few thousand at most, and the rest of us are dependent on their ability (and willingness) to configure and  control AI systems properly. The recent widespread computer systems meltdown as a result of a single errant cyber-security patch should already have convinced us of our vulnerability in this respect. 

In the wrong hands, things could, and probably will, go badly. See my blog on AI for more details of the advantages...and the perils, of AI.

One thing is certain - only a wholesale evolutionary change in the human psyche would remove the impetus for tribalism  and  war within us; we know that major evolutionary change takes hundreds if not thousands of generations to achieve - and requires active selection pressure to drive it. As a species, we simply don't have that long, so our survival is likely to be in the hands of the fates, and is by no means assured.....

More updates to follow in due course....

Viv

First published 23.2.23